In the second part of
his essay, first published in 1752, Hume considers the fate of the balance of power since 1500, and
notes that the danger of universal monarchy posed by Charles V and the
Austro-Spanish Hapsburgs was not as large as advertised: they were “more likely
to decay, of themselves, from internal defects, than to overthrow all the
bulwarks raised against them.” Following the decline of the Hapsburgs was the
rise of Louis XIV’s France, in Hume’s view a much more serious threat. In
digesting the lessons of Britain’s eighteenth century wars, Hume draws
conclusions and issues warnings that anticipate basic features of the American experience since the United States became a world power. After drawing attention to
various failures of British policy—too beset by the ancient Greek spirit of
jealous emulation, too solicitous toward allies, too willing to bankrupt the
nation through debt—Hume observed that these excesses might beget the opposite
extreme and render Britain “totally careless and supine with regard to the fate
of Europe.” Here, in a nutshell, is the oft-invoked cycle of intervention to
isolation and back again. Of yet greater relevance is Hume’s demonstration of
how “ambition blindly labours for the destruction of the conqueror,” with human
nature checking itself “in its airy elevation.” The United States would seem
not to be entirely immune from this tendency. Was not some such phenomenon--of hubris punished by failure--the lesson of the last decade? (2221 words)
It is a question whether the idea of the balance of power be owing entirely to modern policy, or
whether the phrase only has been
invented in the later ages? It is certain that Xenophon in his Institution of
Cyrus, represents the combination of the Asiatic powers to have arisen from a
jealousy of the increasing force of the Medes and Persians; and though that
elegant composition should be supposed altogether a romance, this sentiment,
ascribed by the author to the Eastern princes, is at least a proof of the
prevailing notion of ancient times.
In all the politics of Greece, the anxiety, with regard to
the balance of power, is apparent, and is expressly pointed out to us, even by
the ancient historians. Thucydides represents the league which was formed
against Athens, and which produced the Peloponnesian war, as entirely owing to
this principle. And after the decline of Athens, when the Thebans and Lacedemonians
disputed for sovereignty, we find that the Athenians (as well as many other republics)
always threw themselves into the lighter scale, and endeavoured to preserve the
balance. They supported Thebes against Sparta, till the great victory gained by
Epaminondas at Leuctra; after which they immediately went over to the
conquered, from generosity, as they pretended, but in reality from their
jealousy of the conquerors.
Whoever will read Demosthenes's oration for the Megalopolitans,
may see the utmost refinements on this principle, that ever entered into the
head of a Venetian or English speculatist. And upon the first rise of the
Macedonian power, this orator immediately discovered the danger, sounded the
alarm throughout all Greece, and at last assembled that confederacy under the
banners of Athens, which fought the great and decisive battle of Chaeronea.
It is true, the Grecian wars are regarded by historians as
wars of emulation rather than of politics; and each state seems to have had
more in view the honour of leading the rest, than any well-grounded hopes of
authority and dominion. If we consider, indeed, the small number of inhabitants
in any one republic, compared to the whole, the great difficulty of forming
sieges in those times, and the extraordinary bravery and discipline of every
freeman among that noble people; we shall conclude, that the balance of power
was, of itself; sufficiently secured in Greece, and need not to have been
guarded with that caution which may be requisite in other ages. But whether we
ascribe the shifting of sides in all the Grecian republics to jealous emulation
or cautious politics, the effects were alike, and every prevailing power was
sure to meet with a confederacy against it, and that often composed of its
former friends and allies. . . .
The reason why it is supposed that the ancients were
entirely ignorant of the balance of power,
seems to be drawn from the Roman history more than the Grecian; and as the
transactions of the former are generally more familiar to us, we have thence
formed all our conclusions. It must be owned, that the Romans never met with
any such general combination or confederacy against them, as might naturally
have been expected from the rapid conquests and declared ambition; but were
allowed peaceably to subdue their neighbours, one after another, till they
extended their dominion over the whole known world. Not to mention the fabulous
history of their Italic wars, there was, upon Hannibal's invasion of the Roman
state, a remarkable crisis, which ought to have called up the attention of all
civilized nations. It appeared afterwards (nor was it difficult to be observed
at the time) that this was a contest for universal empire; yet no prince or
state seems to have been in the least alarmed about the event or issue of the
quarrel. Philip of Macedon remained neuter, till he saw the victories of Hannibal;
and then most imprudently formed an alliance with the conqueror, upon terms
still more imprudent. He stipulated, that he was to assist the Carthaginian
state in their conquest of Italy; after which they engaged to send over forces into
Greece, to assist him in subduing the Grecian commonwealth.
The Rhodian and Achaean republics are much celebrated by
ancient historians for their wisdom and sound policy; yet both of them assisted
the Romans in their wars against Philip and Antiochus. And what may be esteemed
still a stronger proof, that this maxim was not generally known in those ages,
no ancient author has remarked the imprudence of these measures, nor has even
blamed that absurd treaty above-mentioned, made by Philip with the
Carthaginians. Princes and statesmen, in all ages, may, beforehand, be blinded
in their reasonings with regard to events: but it is somewhat extraordinary,
that historians, afterwards, should not form a sounder judgment of them.
Massinissa, Attalus, Prusias, in gratifying their private
passions, were all of them the instruments of the Roman greatness, and never
seem to have suspected, that they were forging their own chains, while they
advanced the conquests of their ally. A simple treaty and agreement between
Massinissa and the Carthaginians, so much required by mutual interest, barred
the Romans from all entrance into Africa, and preserved liberty to mankind.[Ed.
note: “As king of Numidia (202-148 B.C.) Masinissa followed an aggressive
policy against neighboring Carthage. When Carthage was finally goaded into
attacking Masinissa, Rome declared war on Carthage. This Third Punic War
(149-146 B.C.) led to the destruction of Carthage and the establishment of its
territory as the Roman province of Africa.”]
The only prince we meet with in the Roman history, who seems
to have understood the balance of power, is Hiero, king of Syracuse. Though the
ally of Rome, he sent assistance to the Carthaginians during the war of the
auxiliaries; “Esteeming it requisite,” says Polybius, both in order to retain
his dominions in Sicily, and to preserve the Roman friendship, that Carthage
should be safe; lest by its fall the remaining power should be able, without
contrast or opposition, to execute every purpose and undertaking. And here he
acted with great wisdom and prudence : for that is never, on any account, to be
overlooked; nor ought such a force ever to be thrown into one hand, as to
incapacitate the neighbouring states from defending their rights against it.”
Here is the aim of modern politics pointed out in express terms.
In short, the maxim of preserving the balance of power is founded
so much on common sense and obvious reasoning, that it is impossible it could
altogether have escaped antiquity, where we find, in other particulars, so many
marks of deep penetration and discernment. If it was not so generally known and
acknowledged as at present, it had at least an influence on all the wiser and
more experienced princes and politicians. And indeed, even at present, however
generally known and acknowledged among speculative reasoners, it has not, in
practice, an authority much more extensive among those who govern the world.
After the fall of the Roman empire, the form of government,
established by the northern conquerors, incapacitated them, in a great measure,
for farther conquests, and long maintained each state in its proper boundaries.
But when vassalage and the feudal militia were abolished, mankind were anew
alarmed by the danger of universal monarchy, from the union of so many kingdoms
and principalities in the person of the Emperor Charles. But the power of the
house of Austria, founded on extensive but divided dominions; and their riches,
derived chiefly from mines of gold and silver, were more likely to decay, of
themselves, from internal defects, than to overthrow all the bulwarks raised
against them. In less than a century, the force of that violent and haughty
race was shattered, their opulence dissipated, their splendor eclipsed. A new
power succeeded, more formidable to the liberties of Europe, possessing all the
advantages of the former, and labouring under none of its defects, except a
share of that spirit of bigotry and persecution, with which the house of
Austria was so long, and still is so much infatuated.
In the general wars maintained against this ambitious power,
Great Britain has stood foremost, and she still maintains her station. Beside
her advantages of riches and situation, her people are animated with such a
national spirit, and are so fully sensible of the blessings of their government,
that we may hope their vigour never will languish in so necessary and so just a
cause. On the contrary, if we may judge by the past, their passionate ardour
seems rather to require some moderation; and they have more often erred from a
laudable excess than from a blameable deficiency.
In the first
place, we seem to have been more possessed with the ancient Greek spirit of
jealous emulation, than actuated by the prudent views of modern politics. Our
wars with France have been begun with justice, and even perhaps from necessity,
but have always been too far pushed, from obstinacy and passion. The same
peace, which was afterwards made at Ryswick in 1697, was offered so early as
the year 1692; that concluded at Utrecht in 1712 might have been finished on as
good conditions at Gertruytenberg in 1708; and we might have given at Frankfort,
in 1743, the same terms which we were glad to accept of at Aix-la-Chapelle in
the year 1748. Here then we see, that above half of our wars with France, and
all our public debts, are owing more to our own imprudent vehemence, than to
the ambition of our neighbours.
In the second
place, we are so declared in our opposition to French power, and so alert in
defence of our allies, that they always reckon upon our force as upon their own
; and expecting to carry on war at our expense, refuse all reasonable terms of
accommodation. Habent subjectos, tanquam
suos; viles, ut alienos. [They treat us like slaves, as though we belonged to
them, but they regard us as worthless, as though we belonged to someone else.]
All the world knows, that the factious vote of the House of Commons, in the
beginning of the last parliament, with the professed humour of the nation, made
the Queen of Hungary inflexible in her terms, and prevented that agreement with
Prussia, which would immediately have restored the general tranquillity of
Europe.
In the third
place, we are such true combatants, that, when once engaged, we lose all
concern for ourselves and our posterity, and consider only how we may best
annoy the enemy. To mortgage our revenues at so deep a rate in wars where we
were only accessories, was surely the most fatal delusion, that a nation, which
had any pretensions to politics and prudence, has ever yet been guilty of. That
remedy of funding, if it be a remedy, and not rather a poison, ought, in all
reason, to be reserved to the last extremity; and no evil, but the greatest and
most urgent, should ever induce us to embrace so dangerous an expedient.
These excesses, to which we have been carried, are prejudicial,
and may, perhaps, in time, become still more prejudicial another way, by
begetting, as is usual, the opposite extreme, and rendering us totally careless
and supine with regard to the fate of Europe. The Athenians, from the most
bustling, intriguing, warlike, people of Greece, finding their error in
thrusting themselves into every quarrel, abandoned all attention to foreign
affairs; and in no contest ever took part on either side, except by their
flatteries and complaisance to the victor.
Enormous monarchies are, probably, destructive to human
nature; in their progress, in their continuance, and even in their downfall,
which never can be very distant from their establishment. The military genius,
which aggrandized the monarchy, soon leaves the court, the capital, and the
centre of such a government: while the wars are carried on at a great distance,
and interest so small a part of the state. The ancient nobility, whose
affections attach them to their sovereign, live all at court; and never will
accept of military employments which would carry them to remote and barbarous
frontiers, where they are distant both from their pleasures and their fortune.
The arms of the state must therefore be entrusted to mercenary strangers,
without zeal, without attachment, without honour; ready on every occasion to
turn them against the prince, and join each desperate malcontent who offers pay
and plunder. This is the necessary progress of human affairs: thus human nature
checks itself in its airy elevation; thus ambition blindly labours for the
destruction of the conqueror, of his family, and of every thing near and dear
to him. The Bourbons, trusting to the support of their brave, faithful, and
affectionate nobility, would push their advantage without reserve or
limitation. These, while fired with glory and emulation, can bear the fatigues
and dangers of war; but never would submit to languish in the garrison of
Hungary or Lithuania, forgot at court, and sacrificed to the intrigues of every
minion or mistress who approaches the prince. The troops are filled with
Cravates and Tartars, Hussars and Cossacks, intermingled, perhaps, with a few
soldiers of fortune from the better provinces: and the melancholy fate of the
Roman emperors, from the same cause, is renewed over and over again, till the
final dissolution of the monarchy.
* * *
I have used the critical
edition of Eugene F. Miller, ed., David Hume: Essays Moral Political and
Literary (Liberty Fund, 1987), which has
excellent notes explaining references that are likely to be obscure to the
modern reader. It is available at the Online Library of Liberty. Hume’s essay
may also be found in the valuable compendium of Moorhead Wright, The Theory
and Practice of the Balance of Power
(1975). From the frontispiece of the Liberty Fund edition:
