The following passages
by David Hume, from his Treatise on Human Nature, address the origins of the rules of justice that underlie the laws of
nations. He finds those origins in a mutual interest in peace and safety. The
rules that justice enjoins—the stability of possession, its transference by
consent, and the performance of promises—are the foundation of peace, commerce,
and mutual succor, both within and among nations. The obligation to obey them,
Hume says, arises from interest (or from reflection on the awful consequences
incident to their violation), an account of morality very nearly the opposite
of that set forth by Kant. [Article length: 2300 words]
Hume argues that these rules of justice have the same extent for individuals and nations, but that they lack the same force. States may violate them for a more trivial motive. Though he bends thus far in the direction of realism or reason of state, he also insists that no political writer or statesman would deny the binding character of treaties in normal circumstances. Interestingly, he is skeptical of the value of what we today might term academic philosophy. In the ways of sovereigns, “The practice of the world goes further in teaching us the degrees of our duty, than the most subtle philosophy which was ever yet invented.”
Hume argues that these rules of justice have the same extent for individuals and nations, but that they lack the same force. States may violate them for a more trivial motive. Though he bends thus far in the direction of realism or reason of state, he also insists that no political writer or statesman would deny the binding character of treaties in normal circumstances. Interestingly, he is skeptical of the value of what we today might term academic philosophy. In the ways of sovereigns, “The practice of the world goes further in teaching us the degrees of our duty, than the most subtle philosophy which was ever yet invented.”
* * *
When civil government has been established over the greatest
part of mankind, and different societies have been formed contiguous to each
other, there arises a new set of duties among the neighbouring states, suitable
to the nature of that commerce, which they carry on with each other. Political
writers tell us, that in every kind of intercourse, a body politic is to be
considered as one person; and indeed this assertion is so far just, that
different nations, as well as private persons, require mutual assistance; at
the same time that their selfishness and ambition are perpetual sources of war
and discord. But though nations in this particular resemble individuals, yet as
they are very different in other respects, no wonder they regulate themselves
by different maxims, and give rise to a new set of rules, which we call the laws of nations. Under this head we
may comprise the sacredness of the persons of ambassadors, the declaration of
war, the abstaining from poisoned arms, with other duties of that kind, which
are evidently calculated for the commerce that is peculiar to different
societies.
But though these rules be superadded to the laws of nature,
the former do not entirely abolish the latter; and one may safely affirm, that
the three fundamental rules of justice, the stability of possession, its
transference by consent, and the performance of promises, are duties of princes
as well as of subjects. The same interest produces the same effect in both
cases. Where possession has no stability, there must be perpetual war. Where
property is not transferred by consent, there can be no commerce. Where
promises are not observed, there can be no leagues nor alliances. The
advantages, therefore, of peace, commerce, and mutual succour, make us extend
to different kingdoms the same notions of justice, which take place among
individuals.
There is a maxim very current in the world, which few
politicians are willing to avow, but which has been authorized by the practice
of all ages, that there is a system of
morals calculated for princes, much more free than that which ought to govern
private persons. It is evident this is not to be understood of the lesser
extent of public duties and obligations; nor will anyone be so extravagant as to
assert, that the most solemn treaties ought to have no force among princes. For
as princes do actually form treaties among themselves, they must propose some
advantage from the execution of them; and the prospect of such advantage must
engage them to perform their part, and must establish that law of nature. The
meaning, therefore, of this political maxim is, that though the morality of
princes has the same extent, yet it
has not the same force as that of
private persons, and may lawfully be transgressed from a more trivial motive.
However shocking such a proposition may appear to certain philosophers, it will
be easy to defend it upon those principles, by which we have accounted for the
origin of justice and equity.
When men have found by experience, that it is impossible to
subsist without society, and that it is impossible to maintain society, while
they give free course to their appetites; so urgent an interest quickly restrains
their actions, and imposes an obligation to observe those rules which we call the laws of justice. This obligation of
interest rests not here; but by the necessary course of the passions and
sentiments, gives rise to the moral obligation of duty; while we approve of
such actions as tend to the peace of society, and disapprove of such as tend to
its disturbance. The same natural
obligation of interest takes place among independent kingdoms, and gives rise
to the same morality; so that no one
of ever so corrupt morals will approve of a prince, who voluntarily, and of his
own accord, breaks his word, or violates any treaty. But here we may observe,
that though the intercourse of different states be advantageous, and even
sometimes necessary, yet it is not so necessary nor advantageous as that among
individuals, without which it is utterly impossible for human nature ever to
subsist. Since, therefore, the natural obligation to justice, among different
states, is not so strong as among individuals, the moral obligation, which
arises from it, must partake of its weakness; and we must necessarily give a
greater indulgence to a prince or minister, who deceives another; than to a
private gentleman, who breaks his word of honour.
Should it be asked, what
proportion these two species of morality bear to each other? I would
answer, that this is a question, to which we can never have any precise answer;
nor is it possible to reduce to numbers the proportion, which we ought to fix
betwixt them. One may safely affirm, that this proportion finds itself, without
any art or study of men; as we may observe on many other occasions. The
practice of the world goes further in teaching us the degrees of our duty, than
the most subtle philosophy which was ever yet invented. And this may serve as a
convincing proof, that all men have an implicit notion of the foundation of
those moral rules concerning natural and civil justice, and are sensible, that
they arise merely from human conventions, and from the interest, which we have
in the preservation of peace and order.
* * *
Hume’s conception of
the society of states is further developed in his essay “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts
and Sciences.” Hume insists that it is
impossible for the arts and sciences to arise unless a people enjoys the
blessings of free government. That the arts and sciences should “take their
first rise in a monarchy, is to expect a contradiction.” He also insists that “nothing
is more favourable to the rise of politeness and learning, than a number of
neighbouring and independent states, connected together by commerce and policy.”
His defense of plurality and particularly
as a barrier to the progress of power and authority emphasizes that the mutual
jealousy of neighboring states keeps them from “receiving too lightly the law
from each other.”
* * *
The emulation, which naturally arises among . . .
neighbouring states, is an obvious source of improvement: But what I would chiefly
insist on is the stop, which such limited territories give both to power and to authority.
Extended governments, where a single person has great
influence, soon become absolute; but small ones change naturally into
commonwealths. A large government is accustomed by degrees to tyranny; because
each act of violence is at first performed upon a part, which, being distant
from the majority, is not taken notice of, nor excites any violent ferment.
Besides, a large government, though the whole be discontented, may, by a little
art, be kept in obedience; while each part, ignorant of the resolutions of the
rest, is afraid to begin any commotion or insurrection. Not to mention, that
there is a superstitious reverence for princes, which mankind naturally contract
when they do not often see the sovereign, and when many of them become not
acquainted with him so as to perceive his weaknesses. And as large states can
afford a great expence, in order to support the pomp of majesty; this is a kind
of fascination on men, and naturally contributes to the enslaving of them. . .
.
But the divisions into small states are favourable to learning,
by stopping the progress of authority
as well as that of power. Reputation
is often as great a fascination upon men as sovereignty, and is equally
destructive to the freedom of thought and examination. But where a number of
neighbouring states have a great intercourse of arts and commerce, their mutual
jealousy keeps them from receiving too lightly the law from each other, in
matters of taste and of reasoning, and makes them examine every work of art
with the greatest care and accuracy. The contagion of popular opinion spreads
not so easily from one place to another. It readily receives a check in some
state or other, where it concurs not with the prevailing prejudices. And nothing
but nature and reason, or, at least, what bears them a strong resemblance, can
force its way through all obstacles, and unite the most rival nations into an
esteem and admiration of it.
GREECE was a cluster of little principalities, which soon
became republics; and being united both by their near neighbourhood, and by the
ties of the same language and interest, they entered into the closest
intercourse of commerce and learning. There concurred a happy climate, a soil
not unfertile, and a most harmonious and comprehensive language; so that every
circumstance among that people seemed to favour the rise of the arts and
sciences. Each city produced its several artists and philosophers, who refused
to yield the preference to those of the neighbouring republics: Their contention
and debates sharpened the wits of men: A variety of objects was presented to
the judgment, while each challenged the preference to the rest: and the
sciences, not being dwarfed by the restraint of authority, were enabled to make
such considerable shoots, as are, even at this time, the objects of our
admiration. After the ROMAN christian,
or catholic church had spread itself
over the civilized world, and had engrossed all the learning of the times;
being really one large state within itself, and united under one head; this
variety of sects immediately disappeared, and the PERIPATETIC philosophy was
alone admitted into all the schools, to the utter depravation of every kind of
learning. But mankind, having at length thrown off this yoke, affairs are now
returned nearly to the same situation as before, and EUROPE is at present a
copy at large, of what GREECE was formerly a pattern in miniature. We have seen
the advantage of this situation in several instances. What checked the progress
of the CARTESIAN philosophy, to which the FRENCH nation shewed such a strong
propensity towards the end of the last century, but the opposition made to it
by the other nations of EUROPE, who soon discovered the weak sides of that
philosophy? The severest scrutiny, which NEWTON’S theory has undergone,
proceeded not from his own countrymen, but from foreigners; and if it can
overcome the obstacles, which it meets with at present in all parts of EUROPE,
it will probably go down triumphant to the latest posterity. The ENGLISH are
become sensible of the scandalous licentiousness of their stage, from the
example of the FRENCH decency and morals. The FRENCH are convinced, that their
theatre has become somewhat effeminate, by too much love and gallantry; and
begin to approve of the more masculine taste of some neighbouring nations.
In CHINA, there seems to be a pretty considerable stock of
politeness and science, which, in the course of so many centuries, might
naturally he expected to ripen into something more perfect and finished, than
what has yet arisen from them. But CHINA is one vast empire, speaking one
language, governed by one law, and sympathizing in the same manners. The authority
of any teacher, such as CONFUCIUS, was propagated easily from one corner of the
empire to the other. None had courage to resist the torrent of popular opinion.
And posterity was not bold enough to dispute what had been universally received
by their ancestors. This seems to be one natural reason, why the sciences have
made so slow a progress in that mighty empire.
If we consider the face of the globe, EUROPE, of all the four
parts of the world, is the most broken by seas, rivers, and mountains; and
GREECE of all countries of EUROPE. Hence these regions were naturally divided
into several distinct governments. And hence the sciences arose in GREECE; and
EUROPE has been hitherto the most constant habitation of them.
* * *
David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature (1739), excerpted in the fine study of Arnold Wolfers and Laurence Martin, The Anglo American Tradition in Foreign Affairs: Readings from Thomas More to Woodrow Wilson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956); Hume, “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences,” (1742), Essays Moral Political and Literary,
Eugene Miller, ed. (Liberty Fund, 1985)
Much is notable in these passages, but especially Hume's declaration that "EUROPE is at present a copy at large, of what GREECE was formerly a pattern in miniature"--that is, a system of distinct governments. Hume's idea that these independent governments were formed by nature is grist for Daniel Deudney's mill (with Deudney, in his Bounding Power, stressing a similar insight by Rousseau). But however important "natural" or "material" factors are in prompting this fractured union, may we not say that the WORLD is at present a copy at large, of what EUROPE was formerly a pattern in miniature? Of course, there are profound differences in the eighteenth century European system and the twenty-first century global system, but Europe's experience of a plurality of independent units makes it different from the imperial configurations that appeared elsewhere in the world--in Russia, China, India, and the Ottoman Empire--as the European system was developing. The international thought that this system generated has much relevance for the contemporary world, for the 21st century world does indeed stand to eighteenth century Europe, as eighteenth century Europe once stood to Greece.
