For François de Salignac de la Mothe Fénelon
(1651-1715), whom we extract below, the balance of power was a necessary
underpinning of international order and justice. Fénelon was a French Roman
Catholic prelate who, after having been named Archbishop of Cambrai in 1695, lost
the confidence of Louix XIV due to religious opinions that seemed scandalous to
the king. Exiled to his archdiocese, Fénelon continued to write various works directed to the Duke of
Burgandy, a possible successor to Louis XIV, whom he began to tutor when the
duke was seven years old. The most renowned of these was The Adventures of
Telemachus, composed in 1693-94, a not-so-thinly-veiled attack on absolute
monarchy. He gave advice to the duke on the responsibilities of kingship and
warned, unavailingly, of the ambitions that might bring France low. In Fénelon’s
hands, the balance of power meant watchful prevention of any situation by which
one power could overawe the rest, for such a prince, barring a miracle, would
inevitably abuse his power. Respect for the balance of power made Europe into “a
kind of society and general republic,” formed to force moderation on those
tempted by superior power. (1283 words)
* * *
Neighbouring states are not only obliged to observe towards
each other the rules of justice and public faith; but they are under a
necessity, for the security of each, and the common interest of all, to
maintain together a kind of society and general republic; for the most powerful
will certainly at length prevail and overthrow the rest, unless they unite
together to make a counterweight.
It is not to be expected, among men, that a superior power
will contain itself within the bounds of an exact moderation, and that it will
not employ its force to obtain for itself what advantages it can, by oppressing
the weaker. Or if this power should happen to be for some time harmless in the
hands of an excellent prince, who could bear such prosperity so well, the
wonder, 'tis likely, would cease with his reign: For the natural ambition of
princes, the flatteries of their courtiers, and the prejudices of nations
themselves will not suffer us to believe that a people who had it in their
power to subdue their neighbours, would abstain from it for any considerable
time. A reign conspicuous for such extraordinary justice, would be the ornament
of history, and a prodigy not to be looked for again.
We are then to expect, what in reality we see frequently
happen, that every nation will seek to prevail over its neighbours; and
therefore every nation is obliged, for its proper security, to watch against,
and by all means restrain the excessive increase of greatness in any of its
neighbours. Nor is this injustice; 'tis to preserve itself and its neighbours
from servitude; 'tis to contend for the liberty, tranquillity, and happiness of
all in general: For the over-increase of power in any one influences the
general system of all the surrounding nations. Thus the successive changes
which have happened in the house of Burgundy, and which afterwards raised that
of Austria, have altered the face of affairs throughout Europe. All Europe had
reason to dread an universal monarchy under Charles V, especially after he had
defeated and taken Francis I at Pavia. 'Tis certain that a nation, having no
pretence directly to meddle with the affairs of Spain, had at that time a very
good right to oppose that formidable power which appeared ready to swallow up
all.
Private men indeed have no right to oppose the increase of
their neighbour's wealth, because they cannot pretend it may prove prejudicial
or destructive to them. There are laws and magistrates to suppress injustice
and violence among families unequal in power.
But the case of states is different, the overgrowth of one
of these may prove the ruin and enslavement of all its neighbours. Here are
neither laws nor judges established for a barrier against the invasions of the
strongest; they have, therefore, reason to suppose that the strongest will
invade their liberties as soon as there is no force sufficient to oppose them.
Each of them may and ought to prevent that increase of power which would
endanger the liberty of his own people, and that of all his neighbours. For
example, Philip II of Spain, after he had conquered Portugal, would have made
himself master of England. 'Tis true, he had no right that was well founded;
but supposing his right to have been incontestable, it was the interest of all
Europe to oppose his establishment in England ; because so powerful a kingdom,
added to his other dominions of Spain, Italy, Flanders, and the Indies, would
have enabled him to subject by his maritime force all the other powers of
Christendom. Then summum jus, summa injuria [“More law, more injustice.”]
Any particular right of succession or donation, should have given way to the
natural law that provides for the security of so many nations. Whatever
destroys the balance and tends to set up an universal monarchy, can be no other
than unjust; however it may be founded on the written laws of a particular
country, which can never prevail over the sovereign and universal law of nature
for the common security and liberty, engraven in the hearts of all the nations
of the world.
When a power is grown to such a pitch that all its neighbours
are hardly a match for it, they have an undoubted right to unite for the
restraining of that increase, which, were it suffered to proceed, would become
too great to be opposed in its attempts on the common liberty. But that such
confederacies for restraining the growing power of a state may be lawful, the
danger from it must be real and pressing; the league defensive, or no further
offensive than a just and necessary defence requires; and such bounds must be
set to it as it may not entirely destroy that power which it was formed only to
limit and moderate.
This care to maintain a kind of equality and balance among
neighbouring nations, is that which secures the common repose; and in this
respect such nations, being joined together by commerce, compose, as it were
one great body and a kind of community. Christendom, for example, makes a sort
of general republic which has its interests, its dangers, and its policy. All
the members of this great body owe to one another for the common good, and to
themselves for their particular security, that they oppose the progress of any
one member, which may destroy the balance, and tend to the inevitable ruin of
the other members. Whatever alters the general system of Europe is dangerous,
and draws after it many fatal consequences.
All neighbouring nations are so connected together by their
mutual interests, that the least progress of any one is sufficient to alter the
general balance, which makes the security of the whole; as when one stone is
taken out of an arch, the whole falls to the ground, because all the stones
sustain each other in pushing against each other. 'Tis a duty then for
neighbouring nations to concur for the common safety against one who grows too
powerful, as it is for fellow-citizens to unite against an invader of the
liberty of their country. If there is a duty owing by every citizen to his
particular society or country, every nation, by the same reason, is obliged to
consult the welfare and repose of that universal republic of which it is a
member and in which are enclosed all the countries composed of private men. . .
.
The state of the Romans and of Charlemagne is by no means a
desirable condition. First, because to arrive at it, you must commit all manner
of injustice and violence; seize what is not your own, and that by the most
bloody and continued wars. Then the design is very dangerous: States have often
perished by these ambitious follies. And lastly, vast empires, which have been
formed by means of so many mischiefs, are generally the occasion of others yet
more dreadful by their fall. The first minority, or weak reign, dissolves the
overgrown body, and separates the people, yet unaccustomed to the yoke of
subjection, or to mutual union. Then what divisions, what confusions, what
anarchies, without remedy! To be sensible of this, we need only reflect on the
mischiefs brought on the west, by the sudden downfall of the empire of
Charlemagne; and on the east, by the subversion of that of Alexander, whose
captains made greater havoc in sharing the spoils of his victory, than he had
done in the conquest of Asia. This then is of all the cases the most dazzling
and fallacious, and the most fatal in its consequences to those who arrive at
it.
* * *
From “Two Essays on the Balance of Power . . . Printed in
the Year 1720,” in A Collection of Scarce and Valuable Tracks (Lord Somers
Tracts), xiii. 2nd edition, 1815, pp 766-70, excerpted in the excellent compendium of Moorhead
Wright, ed., Theory and Practice of the
Balance of Power, 1486-1914 (London: Dent, 1975).
Image of Fénelon courtesy of Wikipedia
