IR Folks from Times Past

IR Folks from Times Past
Showing posts with label B. International Society. Show all posts
Showing posts with label B. International Society. Show all posts

Friday, April 4, 2014

Tocqueville: Unlimited Power a Dangerous Thing

In an earlier selection from Benjamin Constant, we encountered Constant denouncing Hobbes and Rousseau for vesting an absolute authority in the state. Constant, reacting to the French Revolution and the sovereignty it vested in the people, denounced the idea that any government, formed of whatever components, could be absolute: “When you establish that the sovereignty of the people is unlimited, you create and toss at random into human society a degree of power which is too large in itself, and which is bound to constitute an evil, in whatever hands it is placed.” Objecting to the monarchs of the old regime, the people had directed their wrath “against the holders of the power rather than against the power itself. Instead of destroying it, they have simply thought of replacing it. It was a curse, yet they have regarded it as a conquest.”

These selections from Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America come from his famous fifteenth chapter on “Unlimited Power of the Majority in the United States and Its Consequences.” They eloquently restate Constant’s fundamental propositions. Tocqueville does not explore here, in his defense of checks and balances on majoritarian democracy, the need for similar checks and balances at the international level, but his thoughts are perfectly consonant with the defense of the balance of power given by Fenelon.

* * *

I do not think that, for the sake of preserving liberty, it is possible to combine several principles in the same government so as really to oppose them to one another. The form of government that is usually termed mixed has always appeared to me a mere chimera. Accurately speaking, there is no such thing as a mixed government in the sense usually given to that word, because in all communities some one principle of action may be discovered which preponderates over the others. England in the last century, which has been especially cited as an example of this sort of government, was essentially an aristocratic state, although it comprised some great elements of democracy; for the laws and customs of the country were such that the aristocracy could not but preponderate in the long run and direct public affairs according to its own will. The error arose from seeing the interests of the nobles perpetually contending with those of the people, without considering the issue of the contest, which was really the important point. When a community actually has a mixed government--that is to say, when it is equally divided between adverse principles--it must either experience a revolution or fall into anarchy.

I am therefore of the opinion that social power superior to all others must always be placed somewhere; but I think that liberty is endangered when this power finds no obstacle which can retard its course and give it time to moderate its own vehemence.

Unlimited power is in itself a bad and dangerous thing. Human beings are not competent to exercise it with discretion. God alone can be omnipotent, because his wisdom and his justice are always equal to his power. There is no power on earth so worthy of honor in itself or clothed with rights so sacred that I would admit its uncontrolled and all-predominant authority. When I see that the right and the means of absolute command are conferred on any power whatever, be it called a people or a king, an aristocracy or a democracy, a monarchy or a republic, I say there is the germ of tyranny, and I seek to live elsewhere, under other laws.

In my opinion, the main evil of the present democratic institutions of the United States does not arise, as is often asserted in Europe, from their weakness, but from their irresistible strength. I am not so much alarmed at the excessive liberty which reigns in that country as at the inadequate securities which one finds there against tyranny. an individual or a party is wronged in the United States, to whom can he apply for redress? If to public opinion, public opinion constitutes the majority; if to the legislature, it represents the majority and implicitly obeys it; if to the executive power, it is appointed by the majority and serves as a passive tool in its hands. The public force consists of the majority under arms; the jury is the majority invested with the right of hearing judicial cases; and in certain states even the judges are elected by the majority. However iniquitous or absurd the measure of which you complain, you must submit to it as well as you can.

If, on the other hand, a legislative power could be so constituted as to represent the majority without necessarily being the slave of its passions, an executive so as to retain a proper share of authority, and a judiciary so as to remain independent of the other two powers, a government would be formed which would still be democratic while incurring scarcely any risk of tyranny.

I do not say that there is a frequent use of tyranny in America at the present day; but I maintain that there is no sure barrier against it, and that the causes which mitigate the government there are to be found in the circumstances and the manners of the country more than in its laws.

* * *

In free countries, where everyone is more or less called upon to give his opinion on affairs of state, in democratic republics, where public life is incessantly mingled with domestic affairs, where the sovereign authority is accessible on every side, and where its attention can always be attracted by vociferation, more persons are to be met with who speculate upon its weaknesses and live upon ministering to its passions than in absolute monarchies. Not because men are naturally worse in these states than elsewhere, but the temptation is stronger and at the same time of easier access. The result is a more extensive debasement of character.

Democratic republics extend the practice of currying favor with the many and introduce it into all classes at once; this is the most serious reproach that can be addressed to them. This is especially true in democratic states organized like the American republics, where the power of the majority is so absolute and irresistible that one must give up one's rights as a citizen and almost abjure one's qualities as a man if one intends to stray from the track which it prescribes.

In that immense crowd which throngs the avenues to power in the United States, I found very few men who displayed that manly candor and masculine independence of opinion which frequently distinguished the Americans in former times, and which constitutes the leading feature in distinguished characters wherever they may be found. It seems at first sight as if all the minds of the Americans were formed upon one model, so accurately do they follow the same route. A stranger does, indeed, sometimes meet with Americans who dissent from the rigor of these formulas, with men who deplore the defects of the laws, the mutability and the ignorance of democracy, who even go so far as to observe the evil tendencies that impair the national character, and to point out such remedies as it might be possible to apply; but no one is there to hear them except yourself, and you, to whom these secret reflections are confided, are a stranger and a bird of passage. They are very ready to communicate truths which are useless to you, but they hold a different language in public.

If these lines are ever read in America, I am well assured of two things: in the first place, that all who peruse them will raise their voices to condemn me; and, in the second place, that many of them will acquit me at the bottom of their conscience.

I have heard of patriotism in the United States, and I have found true patriotism among the people, but never among the leaders of the people. This may be explained by analogy: despotism debases the oppressed much more than the oppressor: in absolute monarchies the king often has great virtues, but the courtiers are invariably servile. It is true that American courtiers do not say "Sire," or "Your Majesty," a distinction without a difference. They are forever talking of the natural intelligence of the people whom they serve; they do not debate the question which of the virtues of their master is pre-eminently worthy of admiration, for they assure him that he possesses all the virtues without having acquired them, or without caring to acquire them; they do not give him their daughters and their wives to be raised at his pleasure to the rank of his concubines; but by sacrificing their opinions they prostitute themselves. Moralists and philosophers in America are not obliged to conceal their opinions under the veil of allegory; but before they venture upon a harsh truth, they say: "We are aware that the people whom we are addressing are too superior to the weaknesses of human nature to lose the command of their temper for an instant. We should not hold this language if we were not speaking to men whom their virtues and their intelligence render more worthy of freedom than all the rest of the world." The sycophants of Louis XIV could not flatter more dexterously.

For my part, I am persuaded that in all governments, whatever their nature may be, servility will cower to force, and adulation will follow power. The only means of preventing men from degrading themselves is to invest no one with that unlimited authority which is the sure method of debasing them.

* * *

If ever the free institutions of America are destroyed, that event may be attributed to the omnipotence of the majority, which may at some future time urge the minorities to desperation and oblige them to have recourse to physical force. Anarchy will then be the result, but it will have been brought about by despotism.

* * *


Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, etext at University of Virginia.  From the Henry Reeve translation, revised and corrected, 1899. 

Saturday, March 1, 2014

Hume: The Three Fundamental Rules of Justice

The following passages by David Hume, from his Treatise on Human Nature, address the origins of the rules of justice that underlie the laws of nations. He finds those origins in a mutual interest in peace and safety. The rules that justice enjoins—the stability of possession, its transference by consent, and the performance of promises—are the foundation of peace, commerce, and mutual succor, both within and among nations. The obligation to obey them, Hume says, arises from interest (or from reflection on the awful consequences incident to their violation), an account of morality very nearly the opposite of that set forth by Kant. [Article length: 2300 words]

Hume argues that these rules of justice have the same extent for individuals and nations, but that they lack the same force. States may violate them for a more trivial motive. Though he bends thus far in the direction of realism or reason of state, he also insists that no political writer or statesman would deny the binding character of treaties in normal circumstances. Interestingly, he is skeptical of the value of what we today might term academic philosophy. In the ways of sovereigns, “The practice of the world goes further in teaching us the degrees of our duty, than the most subtle philosophy which was ever yet invented.”

* * *

When civil government has been established over the greatest part of mankind, and different societies have been formed contiguous to each other, there arises a new set of duties among the neighbouring states, suitable to the nature of that commerce, which they carry on with each other. Political writers tell us, that in every kind of intercourse, a body politic is to be considered as one person; and indeed this assertion is so far just, that different nations, as well as private persons, require mutual assistance; at the same time that their selfishness and ambition are perpetual sources of war and discord. But though nations in this particular resemble individuals, yet as they are very different in other respects, no wonder they regulate themselves by different maxims, and give rise to a new set of rules, which we call the laws of nations. Under this head we may comprise the sacredness of the persons of ambassadors, the declaration of war, the abstaining from poisoned arms, with other duties of that kind, which are evidently calculated for the commerce that is peculiar to different societies.

But though these rules be superadded to the laws of nature, the former do not entirely abolish the latter; and one may safely affirm, that the three fundamental rules of justice, the stability of possession, its transference by consent, and the performance of promises, are duties of princes as well as of subjects. The same interest produces the same effect in both cases. Where possession has no stability, there must be perpetual war. Where property is not transferred by consent, there can be no commerce. Where promises are not observed, there can be no leagues nor alliances. The advantages, therefore, of peace, commerce, and mutual succour, make us extend to different kingdoms the same notions of justice, which take place among individuals.

There is a maxim very current in the world, which few politicians are willing to avow, but which has been authorized by the practice of all ages, that there is a system of morals calculated for princes, much more free than that which ought to govern private persons. It is evident this is not to be understood of the lesser extent of public duties and obligations; nor will anyone be so extravagant as to assert, that the most solemn treaties ought to have no force among princes. For as princes do actually form treaties among themselves, they must propose some advantage from the execution of them; and the prospect of such advantage must engage them to perform their part, and must establish that law of nature. The meaning, therefore, of this political maxim is, that though the morality of princes has the same extent, yet it has not the same force as that of private persons, and may lawfully be transgressed from a more trivial motive. However shocking such a proposition may appear to certain philosophers, it will be easy to defend it upon those principles, by which we have accounted for the origin of justice and equity.

When men have found by experience, that it is impossible to subsist without society, and that it is impossible to maintain society, while they give free course to their appetites; so urgent an interest quickly restrains their actions, and imposes an obligation to observe those rules which we call the laws of justice. This obligation of interest rests not here; but by the necessary course of the passions and sentiments, gives rise to the moral obligation of duty; while we approve of such actions as tend to the peace of society, and disapprove of such as tend to its disturbance. The same natural obligation of interest takes place among independent kingdoms, and gives rise to the same morality; so that no one of ever so corrupt morals will approve of a prince, who voluntarily, and of his own accord, breaks his word, or violates any treaty. But here we may observe, that though the intercourse of different states be advantageous, and even sometimes necessary, yet it is not so necessary nor advantageous as that among individuals, without which it is utterly impossible for human nature ever to subsist. Since, therefore, the natural obligation to justice, among different states, is not so strong as among individuals, the moral obligation, which arises from it, must partake of its weakness; and we must necessarily give a greater indulgence to a prince or minister, who deceives another; than to a private gentleman, who breaks his word of honour.

Should it be asked, what proportion these two species of morality bear to each other? I would answer, that this is a question, to which we can never have any precise answer; nor is it possible to reduce to numbers the proportion, which we ought to fix betwixt them. One may safely affirm, that this proportion finds itself, without any art or study of men; as we may observe on many other occasions. The practice of the world goes further in teaching us the degrees of our duty, than the most subtle philosophy which was ever yet invented. And this may serve as a convincing proof, that all men have an implicit notion of the foundation of those moral rules concerning natural and civil justice, and are sensible, that they arise merely from human conventions, and from the interest, which we have in the preservation of peace and order.

* * *

Hume’s conception of the society of states is further developed in his essay “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and  Sciences.” Hume insists that it is impossible for the arts and sciences to arise unless a people enjoys the blessings of free government. That the arts and sciences should “take their first rise in a monarchy, is to expect a contradiction.” He also insists that “nothing is more favourable to the rise of politeness and learning, than a number of neighbouring and independent states, connected together by commerce and policy.” His defense of plurality and particularly as a barrier to the progress of power and authority emphasizes that the mutual jealousy of neighboring states keeps them from “receiving too lightly the law from each other.”

* * *

The emulation, which naturally arises among . . . neighbouring states, is an obvious source of improvement: But what I would chiefly insist on is the stop, which such limited territories give both to power and to authority.

Extended governments, where a single person has great influence, soon become absolute; but small ones change naturally into commonwealths. A large government is accustomed by degrees to tyranny; because each act of violence is at first performed upon a part, which, being distant from the majority, is not taken notice of, nor excites any violent ferment. Besides, a large government, though the whole be discontented, may, by a little art, be kept in obedience; while each part, ignorant of the resolutions of the rest, is afraid to begin any commotion or insurrection. Not to mention, that there is a superstitious reverence for princes, which mankind naturally contract when they do not often see the sovereign, and when many of them become not acquainted with him so as to perceive his weaknesses. And as large states can afford a great expence, in order to support the pomp of majesty; this is a kind of fascination on men, and naturally contributes to the enslaving of them. . . .

But the divisions into small states are favourable to learning, by stopping the progress of authority as well as that of power. Reputation is often as great a fascination upon men as sovereignty, and is equally destructive to the freedom of thought and examination. But where a number of neighbouring states have a great intercourse of arts and commerce, their mutual jealousy keeps them from receiving too lightly the law from each other, in matters of taste and of reasoning, and makes them examine every work of art with the greatest care and accuracy. The contagion of popular opinion spreads not so easily from one place to another. It readily receives a check in some state or other, where it concurs not with the prevailing prejudices. And nothing but nature and reason, or, at least, what bears them a strong resemblance, can force its way through all obstacles, and unite the most rival nations into an esteem and admiration of it.

GREECE was a cluster of little principalities, which soon became republics; and being united both by their near neighbourhood, and by the ties of the same language and interest, they entered into the closest intercourse of commerce and learning. There concurred a happy climate, a soil not unfertile, and a most harmonious and comprehensive language; so that every circumstance among that people seemed to favour the rise of the arts and sciences. Each city produced its several artists and philosophers, who refused to yield the preference to those of the neighbouring republics: Their contention and debates sharpened the wits of men: A variety of objects was presented to the judgment, while each challenged the preference to the rest: and the sciences, not being dwarfed by the restraint of authority, were enabled to make such considerable shoots, as are, even at this time, the objects of our admiration. After the ROMAN christian, or catholic church had spread itself over the civilized world, and had engrossed all the learning of the times; being really one large state within itself, and united under one head; this variety of sects immediately disappeared, and the PERIPATETIC philosophy was alone admitted into all the schools, to the utter depravation of every kind of learning. But mankind, having at length thrown off this yoke, affairs are now returned nearly to the same situation as before, and EUROPE is at present a copy at large, of what GREECE was formerly a pattern in miniature. We have seen the advantage of this situation in several instances. What checked the progress of the CARTESIAN philosophy, to which the FRENCH nation shewed such a strong propensity towards the end of the last century, but the opposition made to it by the other nations of EUROPE, who soon discovered the weak sides of that philosophy? The severest scrutiny, which NEWTON’S theory has undergone, proceeded not from his own countrymen, but from foreigners; and if it can overcome the obstacles, which it meets with at present in all parts of EUROPE, it will probably go down triumphant to the latest posterity. The ENGLISH are become sensible of the scandalous licentiousness of their stage, from the example of the FRENCH decency and morals. The FRENCH are convinced, that their theatre has become somewhat effeminate, by too much love and gallantry; and begin to approve of the more masculine taste of some neighbouring nations.

In CHINA, there seems to be a pretty considerable stock of politeness and science, which, in the course of so many centuries, might naturally he expected to ripen into something more perfect and finished, than what has yet arisen from them. But CHINA is one vast empire, speaking one language, governed by one law, and sympathizing in the same manners. The authority of any teacher, such as CONFUCIUS, was propagated easily from one corner of the empire to the other. None had courage to resist the torrent of popular opinion. And posterity was not bold enough to dispute what had been universally received by their ancestors. This seems to be one natural reason, why the sciences have made so slow a progress in that mighty empire.

If we consider the face of the globe, EUROPE, of all the four parts of the world, is the most broken by seas, rivers, and mountains; and GREECE of all countries of EUROPE. Hence these regions were naturally divided into several distinct governments. And hence the sciences arose in GREECE; and EUROPE has been hitherto the most constant habitation of them.

* * *

David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature (1739), excerpted in the fine study of Arnold Wolfers and Laurence Martin, The Anglo American Tradition in Foreign Affairs: Readings from Thomas More to Woodrow Wilson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956); Hume, “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences,” (1742),  Essays Moral Political and Literary, Eugene Miller, ed. (Liberty Fund, 1985)

Much is notable in these passages, but especially Hume's declaration that "EUROPE is at present a copy at large, of what GREECE was formerly a pattern in miniature"--that is, a system of distinct governments. Hume's idea that these independent governments were formed by nature is grist for Daniel Deudney's mill (with Deudney, in his Bounding Power, stressing a similar insight by Rousseau). But however important "natural" or "material" factors are in prompting this fractured union, may we not say that the WORLD is at present a copy at large, of what EUROPE was formerly a pattern in miniature? Of course, there are profound differences in the eighteenth century European system and the twenty-first century global system, but Europe's experience of a plurality of independent units makes it different from the imperial configurations that appeared elsewhere in the world--in Russia, China, India, and the Ottoman Empire--as the European system was developing. The international thought that this system generated has much relevance for the contemporary world, for the 21st century world does indeed stand to eighteenth century Europe, as eighteenth century Europe once stood to Greece. 

Friday, December 13, 2013

Venice and the Liberty of States

Esto Perpetua, [be thou everlasting], were the last words of Paulo Sarpi, who died in 1623. The phrase was invoked by John Adams in a letter to Thomas Jefferson in 1820. Adams wished “as devoutly as Father Paul” for the preservation of “our vast American empire and our free institutions,” as Sarpi had wished for the preservation of Venice and its institutions. [i] (Article Length: 6000 words)

Sarpi is a now almost totally forgotten figure, though his importance for early political thought is very considerable. From his first appearance as the dignified representative of Venice in its struggle against the Papacy, he was seen in England as a sort of oracle, and his sayings and maxims passed into Anglo-American thought and were absorbed by it. Sarpi had his many detractors, both at the time and subsequently. His books were ordered burned by the papacy and placed on the Index; at a later period, even critics sympathetic to his strictures against the Roman church found much cause for fault: a French writer in 1852 held that his history of the Council of Trent was “nothing better than a long satire, lifeless and insipid; often, too, inaccurate and unfair.” [ii] But there are a great many encomiums as well. Gibbon considered him as among the four best early modern historians, standing alongside Guicciardini, Machiavelli, and Davila in eminence. These writers are the inventors of what we should now term “international history,” as it commenced its modern phase. Sarpi’s keenest contemporary student, William Bouwsma, notes that Sarpi took up in his History of the Council of Trent where Guicciardini had left off in his History of Italy, both of them narrating the history of a larger European constellation of power politics that emerged in the Renaissance and grew in geographic scope thereafter. Sarpi is the central figure in Bouwsma’s magnificent study, Venice and the Defense of Republican Liberty (1968), from which I will be drawing extensive extracts below. Bouwsma's thick book is about far more than Sarpi, but Sarpi is the man who represents Venice at its best. His history of the Tridentine council, writes Bouwsma, has “some claim to be considered the last major literary achievement of the Italian Renaissance. " [iii]

The central theme in that struggle with Rome was Sarpi’s refutation of the universalistic pretensions of the papacy and his defense of the rights of independent states. The idea that states, as representatives of distinct human communities, must perforce have the direction of them, and that in doing so they conserve basic human values of freedom and autonomy, entered strongly into the subsequent history of the European state system. The idea, indeed, continues to form a ground norm—albeit a deeply contested grundnorm—of the contemporary international legal order. Today, the struggle between universalism and particularism takes the form in international relations of a clash between universal human rights and state sovereignty. Though the specific content of these universalisms has changed (as has, arguably, the complex of values represented by particularist ideas), the clash between these two conceptions has an enduring character. 
Sarpi’s thought is especially notable as expressing a commanding view of the imperative of state sovereignty or of international freedom as against the dictates of a universalist religion or ideology; it is one of the first great statements of what the English School of IR calls "pluralism." Against the universalist pretensions of the Counter Reformation, which appeared to Sarpi “as a disguise for the interests of Spain and the worldly pretensions of the papacy,” Sarpi “asserted the particularistic and political (though not necessarily unreligious) conceptions of the Renaissance. What he dreaded above all was the imposition, through Spanish arms, of what he significantly described as 'an Octavian peace.' The imperial Pax Romana, the nostalgic ideal so dear to Europeans since the fall of Rome, meant for him precisely the most dreadful of political arrangements, a monolith in which all the achievements of such particular communities as Venice must surely perish.” (553) “Underlying Sarpi's hostility to universalism was always his profound belief that the lofty principle it appeared to embody was in reality only an instrument for the perennial imperialism of Rome.” (582) Early on, addressing the doge and senate of Venice, Sarpi expressed his fundamental conviction thusly:
I cannot refrain from saying that no injury penetrates more deeply into a principate than when its majesty, that is to say sovereignty, is limited and subjected to the laws of another. A prince who possesses a small part of the world is equal in this respect to one who possesses much; Romulus was no less a prince than Trajan, nor is your Serenity now greater than your forebears when their empire had not extended beyond the lagoons. He who takes away a part of his state from a prince makes him a lesser prince but leaves him a prince; he who imposes laws and obligations on him deprives him of the essence of a prince, even if he possessed the whole of Asia. (437-38)

* * *
A monk in the Catholic Servite order who had already distinguished himself in Venice’s service, Sarpi emerged in 1606, the year of the Church’s interdict against Venice, as a figure of European renown and significance, “the oracle of the age.” The function of the interdict, writes Bouwsma, was at last to “bring fully to the surface the antithesis between the political and cultural achievements of the Italian Renaissance and the ideals of medieval Catholicism, now reinvigorated by the Counter Reformation. Each side in the bitter struggle over the interdict was persuaded that the outcome was crucial for all that it held most dear.” (417) The stakes were indeed deadly. Sarpi, having bested Pope Paul V in his initial confrontation with him, narrowly escaped death at the hands of assassins instigated by Paul. There were further plots against him until his death, by natural causes, at the age of 71.
The dispute with Venice that brought on the interdict was twofold. One was Rome’s objection to Venice’s incarceration of two priests on allegations of poisoning, murder, and (reports Sarpi’s late nineteenth century biographer, Alexander Robertson) “licentiousness of a most revolting and even unnatural kind.”[iv] The second was a property dispute, centered on the church’s claim of an exemption from taxation. “Half the area of the city of Venice was occupied by buildings and gardens belonging to the Church, and one-fourth of all the real property in the province of Venetia was in its hands.” With Church properties exempt from taxation, “the laity had to bear its own share, and that of the Church besides.” Threatening to the Republic, writes Robertson, was “the ruinous combination of a fattening Church and a famishing country, pride in the clergy and poverty in the people.” (76) Venice extended to the whole of its dominions older ordinances, previously restricted to Venice itself, that prohibited the Church from building new religious properties without the government’s consent, and disqualified it from retaining property given to it by donation or inheritance (requiring instead that the property be sold). The Pope’s demand that the priests be released and the property laws overturned was rebuffed, incurring the Pope’s wrath and a threat to place Venice under interdict and excommunication. “We are above all,” said Pope Paul. “God has given to us power over all. We are able to depose Kings, and to set up others, and we are over those things which tend to a supernatural end.” (77)
Venice, under Sarpi’s guidance, denied the Church’s right to interfere in the civil affairs of the Republic. In Robertson’s summation:
Fra Paulo was able to show how the Pope's demands were without precedent in the history of the Republic; how they were contrary to Scripture, to the Fathers, to Church Canons, to the decisions of Councils, and to the bulls of former Popes. Then he carried the question at issue back to first principles, by declaring, and reiterating the declaration, that the Pope's claim to intermeddle in civil matters was a usurpation; and that in these the Republic of Venice recognized no authority but that of God. "God has instituted two kingdoms in the world," he said, "one spiritual and the other temporal, each in its own sphere is supreme and independent. The Kingdom of Christ is not of this world; but in heaven, therefore, religion walks by a heavenly way, the Government of the State by an earthly one, and the one ought never to interfere with the other. God wishes to be served in such a way as to preserve this harmony between the two powers which he has instituted; maintaining them balanced so that one may not usurp the place that belongs to the other." [v]
Venice’s defiance brought on the bull of interdict and excommunication. Its harsh terms looked to disorganize Venice and encourage internal revolt.  
[It embraced] in its anathema not only the rebellious Doge, the Consultore [the office then held by Sarpi], and the other members of the Government, but the whole mass of the people throughout the length and breadth of Venetia, and its dependencies. All alike, young and old, innocent and guilty, were caught within the sweep of this tremendous measure. By the interdict, all were prohibited from receiving the so-called saving sacraments of the Church, and the consolations of religion. By excommunication all were declared to be severed from the body of Christ, which is the Church, and to have become accursed. No more masses were to be said. Baptism, marriage, and burial services were to cease. The churches were to be locked up, and all the priests could withdraw from the devoted land. All social relationships were dissolved. Marriages were declared invalid, and all children born were illegitimate. Husbands could desert their wives, and children disobey their parents. Contracts of all kinds were declared null and void. Allegiance to the Government was at an end. Subjects were absolved from their obligation to pay taxes, and to respect the laws of the land. The design of this wicked invention was to let loose the elements of disorder and rebellion, and throw the whole body politic into a state of anarchy and terror. Then, whilst the Pope preached the doctrine that he was above all law, and all peoples and princes, receiving his commission direct from God, whose representative he was, he as diligently preached this opposite one, that kings and rulers existed by the people, and for the people; and as it was they who set them up, they could legitimately cast them down. Thus the hope was entertained that the people, made to suffer for their rulers’ faults and sins, would rise in rebellion and depose them. (82-83)
Venice had fallen under interdict seven times previously, the first time in 1201, the last a hundred years before in 1509, and over very similar issues. On each occasion, Robertson notes, Venice had been humbled, and it was not unreasonable for Pope Paul V to believe that the weapon that had been successful in the past would be so again. But Sarpi had anticipated the Pope’s attitude and advised a vigorous counterstroke:
Defiance must be met with defiance, the commands of the Pope by the counter-commands of the Republic. The Pope had interdicted all religious services, let the Republic order their continuance. He had commanded the priests to shut their churches, let the Republic order them to keep them open. He had charged the priests to read publicly the censures, and to affix them to the doors of their churches, let the Republic order them to send all documents coming from Rome unopened to the Doge’s Palace. He had permitted them to quit the “accursed land,” let the Republic forbid them to stir from the dioceses and parishes. He had sought to cancel contracts and dissolve relationships, let the Republic see to it that all obligations were fulfilled, and all orderly ties maintained. . . . And, since fear of death was the sanction of the Pope’s bulls, let fear of death be that of the Senate’s decree. The Pope’s death penalty was to be executed on the soul hereafter, let that of the Republic be executed on the body now. . . . [In promulgating the bull, the Pope] was declared to have shut his ears to the voice of reason, of Scripture, of the Fathers and of the Sacred Canons, and to have trampled on the divinely granted rights of Kings and Governments. The bull was therefore pronounced to be null and void, and a thing to be utterly despised and ignored. (85-87)
Each side in this great dispute appealed to law: “Rome charged again and again that the Venetian legislation to which it took objection was in some fundamental sense illegal, while Venice insisted that, on the contrary, the Roman position was an assault on the law.” (Bouwsma, 449) So, too, each side charged the other with Machiavellism.
Sarpi himself attributed to the pope the doctrine that the end justifies the means, the end in this case being "the conservation and increase of the temporal authority which they claim"; hence the efforts of Rome to incite subjects to rebellion. But the charge of preferring politics to principle was more frequently directed by Rome against Venice; Rome, with good reason, recognized that its true enemy was the political mentality of the Renaissance. Again and again Venice was accused (as though the criminality of this were self-evident) of basing her policy on ragione di stato, which [the papal writer]  Bovio did not hesitate to label as heresy. It was, he wrote, a "heretical concept of certain impious men who believe that reason of state dispenses from all laws, human and divine, and legitimizes every injustice and impiety, so that anything which favors the preservation and increase of the state is held incapable of harming the soul.” (445)
All Christendom took a keen interest in this riveting contest between Paul the pope and Paul the friar, but its moral and political effect was uneven. France’s king, Henry IV, had been annoyed by the controversy, and thought that both sides had brought on “an Iliad of inconveniences for a Helen or so little merit that all past history reveals no example of Christendom being troubled for a thing so trifling.” (404n). The interdict was lifted in the following year, after France mediated a face-saving settlement favorable to Venice. The Most Serene Republic had represented its claim as one in which other states were also vitally interested, but other powers, comments Bouwsma, proved unwilling to declare themselves even when sympathetic to Venice’s aims.
To some extent the failure of the secular powers to side openly with Venice reflected their appraisal of the practical significance of the papal offensive. They saw in it little danger to themselves, and their nonchalance was perhaps a more devastating comment on the ambitions of the Counter Reformation than their active support for the beleaguered Republic might have been. At the same time they were concerned to prevent the Venetian crisis, so petty in itself however freighted with theoretical significance for the contenders, from turning into a general European war. The Habsburg powers and France feared each other far more than they feared the pope, even a pope victorious over Venice. The Venetian interdict therefore became an occasion for further jockeying between France, Spain, and the Empire. For this reason it distantly continued the earlier Habsburg-Valois struggles over Italy (as, indeed, contemporaries were inclined to recognize) as well as being one of the earliest among the crises leading to the Thirty Years' War. (404) 
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Sarpi’s History of the Council of Trent was written in the decade following the controversy over the interdict and was first published in London in 1619. It constituted a subtle but devastating deconstruction of the papacy. It recounted the historical development of the Concilio Tridentino, held half a century previously in fits and starts from 1545 to 1563, but Sarpi traversed much further afield in his investigations. Bouwsma unfolds in several passages the links to the Florentine writers Machiavelli and Guicciardini:
Since Sarpi viewed the apparently religious decisions of the Council as in reality an expression of sinister political interests and the papacy itself as an essentially political agency, a full understanding of what had transpired at Trent required him to provide an extended account of the political events leading up to the first session. Thus, chronologically as well as thematically, Sarpi's Istoria del Concilio Tridentino is in some degree a continuation of Guicciardini's Storia d'Italia. Among its other uses the Council of Trent allowed Sarpi to deal with the next phase in the continuing crisis of Italy that had so preoccupied Machiavelli and Guicciardini in their rather different moods. But now the Italian powers may be seen to count for even less than in the earlier phases of the crisis. The duke of Florence is no more than a presence, and even Venice is hardly mentioned. Only France, Spain, and the emperor can significantly affect events; and although the major action in Italy now is chiefly focused in Trent, it can only be explained by an even larger attention to developments abroad than had been necessary for Guicciardini. (591)
In his view the church, by assuming the attitudes and asserting the claims of an earthly government, had inevitably exposed itself to those transformations which all polities, as agencies of this world, are destined to endure. He believed that the church had originated as a kind of free and spiritual republic; but then, taking on an increasingly formal organization and more and more openly political responsibilities and attitudes, it had passed step by step through the same constitutional evolution as secular states, whose cycle of forms had been described long ago by the ancients and more recently by Machiavelli. Sarpi's analysis of the historical development of the church, and similarly his conception of reform, were profoundly influenced by the constitutional speculation of the Renaissance. His basic questions are thus familiar: how does a republic degenerate into a principate? is such a transformation to be avoided or desired? can it be reversed? what is a tyrant and how does he behave? can he be restrained? The novelty of Sarpi's thought lies in the fact that he puts these questions to the church. (607-08)
Sarpi's history of the Council of Trent is thus necessarily a political history, and it was appropriate for this reason for him to draw on the methods and attitudes of his Florentine and Venetian predecessors in this genre. Not only does Sarpi treat the popes of the Council much like Machiavellian princes, although deprived of military force and compelled to struggle to maintain a vast tyranny with the arts of peace. In addition his conception of their predicament may be seen as an illustration of a problem with which Renaissance political speculation was centrally concerned: the predicament of the man of virtù, (here clearly virtuosity rather than virtue) contending with circumstances that threaten to destroy him. Sarpi is even more ambivalent, in his depiction of papal action at Trent, than in his attitude to earlier popes as political leaders; because the cynical maneuvering that Sarpi must deplore for its invasion of the church he is compelled to admire, as a student of politics, for its finesse and finally for its success. (614)
The relationship, as exhibited in the Council, between what men professed to believe and the interests they were actually concerned to promote particularly fascinated Sarpi; and he frequently undertook to reveal the sordid purposes that protestations of high principle were designed to mask—a figure which appears more than once in the course of his work . . .  His perception that men like to conceal interest under idealism found expression in neat and general aphorisms. "How differently," Sarpi exclaimed, "do men judge in what    concerns their own interest from how they judge the affairs of another!" "So it happens not only in human things but also in those of religion that when interests change, credulity changes." (576-77)
These are Machiavellian and Guicciardinian themes, but Sarpi occupied what we would today call the moral high ground in his critique of the Church of Rome. His learning was broad, and he maintained a vast correspondence, delighting even in the knowledge possessed by heretics. Underlying his achievements, however, was the evident simplicity of his manners and his devotion to his native city and to truth. Sarpi's life, wrote an admiring Gallican magistrate of Paris, “was proving even more persuasive on behalf of Venice than his arguments; it had caused him first of all to be ‘admired and revered in Venice as a saint,’ and it had given ‘great weight and authority to his books.’" (403)  He depicted in his writings a church that had suffered inordinate corruption through time and could only be reformed by a return to first principles:
His central thesis, developed systematically in the Trattato delle materie beneficiarie but underlying his other writings, was that the decay of political authority begun in the period of the barbarian invasions had gradually loosened all restraints on the clergy and left them a prey to their own most worldly impulses (604)
One of the earliest symptoms of the church's decline, he believed, had been a growing materialism. The Christian community, as he noted, had from the beginning received gifts, which were used partly to support its apostolic leadership, partly for the poor. But its income had grown rapidly, and even before the barbarian invasions there were hints of decline in the administration of this wealth. (605)
The western church had, in the course of the centuries, passed through the whole sequence of constitutional forms and in the usual order, from democracy through aristocracy to monarchy. And the papal monarchy had been converted into an open tyranny by the claim of the pope to stand above the canons that regulated the universal community of Christians. (608)
The original leaders of the church, Sarpi noted, had been “poor and ignorant fishermen” who had never said, “Embrace our preaching, else we will come with an army to destroy your city, else we will declare you excommunicated and abominable, we will condemn you to death.” (466)
Sarpi, as a Catholic monk, had a curious relation to the Reformation, being in it but not quite of it. He detested persecution, writes Bouwsma, and his position seems very close to that of Erasmus. “Sarpi was clearly on the side of latitude and flexibility on all religious questions, and of charity and open discussion rather than force in dealing with error. Thus, as he noted, critics of the Tridentine decrees on the Eucharist had protested that ‘if there were so many legitimate positions, it was necessary to express them, and not force men to believe by terror but with persuasion. But the Council had chosen to make the faith into ‘a despotism such as Saint Paul so much detests.'” (588) In this attitude of the Church, according to Sarpi, lay the basic cause of the Reformation:
[T]he essential cause of the Protestant revolt had been the steady subversion of the ecclesiastical constitution by the papacy, the conversion of the church from a republic into a tyranny, and the transformation of the faith from a religion of freedom and grace into a religion of authority. In this perspective ecclesiastical and religious history could not be readily distinguished; the profound corruption of the former had resulted in the corruption of the latter. And Sarpi identified the rise of heresy in western Europe with that moment in the history of the church, the investiture controversy, when the papacy had first asserted its authority over princes and decisively transformed the church into a system of governmcnt. The ultimate abuse, it had inevitably exposed the church to all other abuses, both of belief and of practice. With Sarpi, therefore, the question whether the causes of the Reformation were primarily institutional or theological was basically meaningless. Both the protest against abuses and the doctrinal challenge had been directed against a more fundamental evil. Although Sarpi was sympathetic to both, he refused to identify himself finally with either. His target was the ultimate abomination. (610)
[Sarpi profoundly disapproved] the Counter Reformation, which had for him not only failed to accomplish genuine reform but was fundamentally subversive of true religion. In his view, true reform depended on the retention of the clergy in their original, spiritual responsibilities, not the effort to assume authority in the temporal realm; on the maintenance of the essential bond between the church and the particular human communities of which it was the spiritual expression; on local autonomy rather than centralization; on the submission of pope and Curia to the same canonical restraints they proposed to impose on others; on the limitation, not the extension, of power. The pope, in this view, must be made to rule the church according to its earliest traditions and under law, in much the same way that the doge ruled Venice, as the constitutional monarch of a spiritual society in which sovereignty was delegated from below. (551)
He was even more deeply concerned with the larger issues Protestantism raised for the nature of the church. From this standpoint Protestantism seemed a hopeful development. As reaction against papal tyranny, it represented the decentralization and pluralism he considered appropriate to the human condition and the church militant. This is probably why, although he supported the political unity of the Protestant world against Spain and the pope, he displayed little interest in the ecumenical impulses of the age. Indeed, he was probably antagonistic to contemporary movements toward religious unity and reconciliation with Rome, which in any case his practical sense considered unrealistic. The reconciliation of the Protestant world to Rome would only have reversed what he considered the most salutary development of the age. (546-47)
Like the Florentines Sarpi found occasion to blame the pope for contributing to the decline of Italian liberty. Thus . . . he criticized Paul III for joining the emperor in 1546 to crush the Lutherans of Germany. If the pope had had any regard for the needs of Italy, Sarpi wrote (though he characteristically attributed this judgment to "the powers of Italy"), he would have kept the war at a distance "and the ultramontane princes in an equilibrium of forces"; for "if the emperor had subjugated Germany, Italy would have been at his mercy and France would not have sufficed to oppose such power." But "if the emperor had been defeated, the eagerness of the [Lutheran] Germans to invade Italy was manifest." Since either outcome of the war would have brought disaster to the peninsula, the pope obviously should have tried to keep the peace. The passage, it may be observed, combines the ideal of balance in international relations, a sense of the folly of subordinating politics to religion, and an awareness of Italy's dependence on events abroad. (591)
Sarpi’s analysis of the constellation of forces facing Venice shows considerable anxiety and is infused with the political calculations so prominent in Machiavelli and Guicciardini. If this was realism, it was realism of a constitutional kind, as Sarpi's idea of the society of states is one regulated by a fundamental law and maintained by the political balance.
[H]e was fully aware that no state could survive if it ignored developments elsewhere. Although he abominated any conception of Europe as a unified polity, he fully recognized that the Continent was a system of states whose actions profoundly concerned one another; and his understanding of this system continued to be determined by the familiar Renaissance conception of balance. Its order was not to be preserved through the application of those universal principles dear to the Spanish Dominicans and to his own contemporary Grotius, but by the manipulation of forces. Sarpi's political world, like Machiavelli's, is ruled by power, not by law. (553)
Sarpi’s dislike of universalism, both political and ecclesiastical, was profound:
For Sarpi, universality had never been more than a fantasy. He denied not only that there had ever been a visible universal church but even a universal council or a universal empire. The emperors of antiquity, he noted, in spite of the universal titles given them by courtesy, had ruled scarcely a tenth of the world. And the so-called general councils of antiquity had represented only the Christians of the Empire, by no means the whole body of believers. The point was cleverly made. It managed simultaneously to diminish the achievement of ancient Rome, to emphasize the historic diversity of Christianity, and by denying the universality of even the venerated councils of antiquity to cast doubt on the traditional authority of a general council lately invoked on behalf of Trent. (581)
He believed that the impulse to articulate and systematize religious belief was basically neither spiritual nor intellectual but chiefly expressed only pride and malice. He regarded theological controversy, because it degraded spiritual realities to the weak and corrupted level of man, as a peculiarly offensive manifestation of human egotism; it seemed even worse than political ambition because it was mean and trivial. (575)
Sarpi seems to have traversed a path similar to that which would later be taken by Edmund Burke, an old Whig turned counter-revolutionary at the time of the French Revolution. When confronted with an implacable revolutionary power in France, Burke concluded that the only recourse was to fight fire with fire. The "pluralist," to again employ English School terminology, became a "solidarist." Such was also Sarpi’s occasional conclusion and temptation, looking not simply to containment and resistance but to overthrow and victory.
The problem of Venice, as he clearly saw, arose primarily from the absence of any adequate counterweight to Spain. Spain could thus hold the initiative in European affairs. Sarpi ruefully noted the "great Spanish felicity, that [Spain] not only freely wills war and peace, but also holds every one in suspense, forced to await the good pleasure of their declarations." The aim of Venetian policy, he felt, was to find allies and so to restore the balance of power: if the French were unreliable, then the English, the Dutch, the Germans, the Swiss, even the Turks. Papal prohibitions against Catholic alliance with heretics he repudiated as another recent innovation based on the political ambitions of Rome. But if the notion of an equilibrium suggests the attitudes of the Renaissance, at other times Sarpi favored quite a different conception. He wrote frequently, to Gallicans as well as Huguenots, of what might be hoped for from a great crusade in which, through an invasion of Italy, all antipapal forces, Protestant as well as Catholic, would finally put an end to the temporal ambitions of Rome. The prospect of war did not altogether please him, but there is perhaps more than resignation in his suggestion that, if a general European conflict should turn out to be "for the increase of [God's] glory and the advancement of the church of God, or at least the purgation of the world, we should not complain." The multitude desires peace, he wrote on another occasion, "but the wise would like war." (553-54)
Those bellicose dreams were not shared by his fellow Venetians, and Sarpi’s influence declined. Venice’s strategic position was poor, and getting worse.
It was increasingly impossible for Venice to identify herself openly or in a general way with Sarpi's views, as the position of the Republic continued to deteriorate through the steady erosion of her Mediterranean commerce, the terrible plague of 1630, and the loss of Crete in the long and expensive conflict with the Turks during the middle decades of the century. Under these pressures Venice slowly weakened, both as a respected European power and as a source of vital republican energies; the oligarchic tendencies already apparent in her aristocratic government intensified; and her libertarian traditions chiefly survived as a calculated permissiveness that made her, in the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a city of pleasure, the gaudiest stop on the Grand Tour of the European upper classes. (625)
Despite Venice’s woes and its increasingly bad reputation by the late eighteenth century, it was still in contemplation of its former glory a figure of commanding respect.  
The importance of Venice and of its ideals and attitudes . . .  by no means ended with the political decline of the Republic. The complex of values, immediately political but ultimately so much more, that had first been clearly enunciated in Renaissance Florence and then elaborated in Venice a century later, had meanwhile been taking root in other parts of Europe; and to this process the nourishment contributed by the political and historical literature of Venice was as significant as the stimulus supplied by the writings of the great Florentines. (625)
Bouwsma’s protestations, sound as they were, were unavailing. In subsequent scholarship and even more in popular culture, Machiavelli and Florence stole the show; Venice was barely audible. But that there should be thousands of works on Machiavelli for every one on Sarpi is really passing strange, as if the division of labor did not apply to scholarship. Surely Bouwsma was disappointed by that dubious cultural turn (he died in 2004). It would have bugged the Florentines themselves: Machiavelli and Guicciardini doubtless would have been thrilled by Sarpi’s performance against the papacy--both having earnestly wished that the world would be “delivered from the tyranny of these wicked priests”--and (I have it on good authority) would not be pleased with its contemporary obscurity. [vi]
Bouwsma’s work was published in 1968. The work breathes a sort of confidence that the ideas Sarpi developed and the complex of values he carried forth were still of consequence. Do they continue so? What is the relation of Sarpi’s ideas to American conceptions of religious liberty or of republicanism? What is the relation to contemporary ideas of international order? There are many questions in the development of international thought that might arise from reflection on Sarpi’s work, but the overriding question is the philosophical one.
Sarpi’s brief against universalism posits a right of autonomous development that rings through the centuries as one pole of international thought. The questions raised by the long contestation between universalism and particularism continue to be highly relevant to reflection on the nature and purpose of international society, as do Sarpi’s positive convictions: “He was against clericalism because of his respect for the dignity of the lay magistrate, and against universalism because of his attachment to Venice and his conviction that particular states incorporated important values, not the least among them the ability to govern effectively.” (583) His was among the earliest entries stressing “the positive role of the state in world affairs.” State sovereignty then was clearly on the side of freedom as against tyranny. Is it so today? 

* * *

These two maps, from The Times Atlas of World History, give an idea of Venice's strategic position in the time of Sarpi. Note that Venice's possessions are strung out along the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea and reached at one time into the Aegean Sea. Venice lost Cyprus to the Turks in 1571 and a century later (in 1669) would lose Crete. The second map shows the vital importance of the Straits of Otranto exiting the Adriatic, a position threatened both by the Turks and the Spaniards (in control of southern Italy).








[i]See David C. Hendrickson, Union, Nation, or Empire, 121.
[ii] History of the Council of Trent, from the French of L.F. Bungener, translated by David Scott (Edinburgh, 1852), 3.
[iii] William J. Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense of Republican Liberty: Renaissance Values in the Age of the Counter Reformation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 623. I use the paperback edition (1984)
[iv] Alexander Robertson, Fra Paolo Sarpi: The Greatest of the Venetians (New York, 1894), 74. Subsequent page citations in the text (76 to 87) are to Robertson’s  celebratory tract. Pages 400 and above are to Bouwsma. The tenor of Robertson’s work is indicated by his remark that “Sarpi, Galileo and their fellows, who were the reprobates of that age, are the heroes of this.” (181)
[v] Robertson, 80. We may note in passing that Sarpi’s language was exactly that of the Federalists in explicating the American Constitution. They held that the constitution partitioned power between two authorities—one concerned with general and the other with local objects, each of which in its own sphere is supreme and independent. See especially Raoul Berger, Federalism: The Framer’s Design (1987)
[vi] Guicciardini, Ricordi, Grayson ed., B-14. Image of Sarpi statue from Wikipedia page on Sarpi. The Times Atlas of World History, ed. Geoffrey Barraclough, as I've noted previously, is the best of the historical atlases. The older edition is available quite cheaply at www.abebooks.com.  

Friday, November 29, 2013

Hobbes and Rousseau: A Liberal Critique

Hobbes and Rousseau are among the great titans in political philosophy, and there is little question that in their works one may find disquisitions of great profundity. Yet in both thinkers there is a deep blindness to the dangers of vesting absolute power in the state, a deficiency brilliantly explored by Benjamin Constant in the early nineteenth century. There is no better statement of the principles of liberalism than Constant’s brief but cogent refutation of absolutism in both thinkers. Constant, as we have seen, also had plenty to say about the kind of foreign policy appropriate to a liberal regime; his strictures against absolutism run closely in parallel with his strictures against war.  (Article Length: 2250 words)

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When you establish that the sovereignty of the people is unlimited, you create and toss at random into human society a degree of power which is too large in itself, and which is bound to constitute an evil, in whatever hands it is placed. Entrust it to one man, to several, to all, you will still find that it is equally an evil. You will think that it is the fault of the holders of such power and, according to the circumstances, you will accuse in turn monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, mixed governments or the representative system. You will be wrong: it is in fact the degree of force, not its holders, which must be denounced. It is against the weapon, not against the arm holding it, that it is necessary to strike ruthlessly. There are weights too heavy for the hand of man.
The error of those who, in good faith, in their love of liberty, have granted boundless power to the sovereignty of the people, derives from the way in which their political ideas were formed. In history they have observed a small number or men, or even a single individual, in possession of an immense power which caused much harm. But their wrath has been directed against the holders of the power rather than against the power itself. Instead of destroying it, they have simply thought of replacing it. It was a curse, yet they have regarded it as a conquest. They have bestowed it upon the entire society. It has necessarily passed from society at large to the majority, from the majority to the hands of a few men, often to a single man. It has caused as much evil as before; while the examples, the objections, the arguments and the evidence have multiplied themselves against all political institutions.
In a society founded upon the sovereignty of the people, it is certain that no individual, no class, are entitled to subject the rest to their particular will. But it is not true that society as a whole has unlimited authority over its members.
The universality of the citizens is sovereign in the sense that no individual, no faction, no partial association can arrogate sovereignty to itself, unless it has been delegated to it. But it does not follow from this that the universality of the citizens, or those who are invested with the sovereignty by them, can dispose sovereignly of the existence of individuals. There is, on the contrary, a part of human existence which by necessity remains individual and independent, and which is, by right, outside any social competence. Sovereignty has only a limited and relative existence. At the point where independence and individual existence begin, the jurisdiction of sovereignty ends. If society oversteps this line, it is as guilty as the despot who has, as his only title, his exterminating sword. Society cannot exceed its competence without usurpation, nor bypass the majority without being factious. The assent of the majority is not enough, in any case, to legitimate its acts: there are acts that nothing could possibly sanction. Whenever some authority commits any such acts, it hardly matters from which source it emanates. It is irrelevant whether it calls itself an individual or a nation. Were it the whole of the nation, save the citizen whom it oppresses, it would be none the more legitimate.
Rousseau overlooked this truth, and his error made of his Social Contract, so often invoked in favour of liberty, the most formidable support for all kinds of despotism. He defined the contract struck between society and its members as the complete alienation of each individual with all his rights, without any reservations, to the community. In order to reassure us about the consequences of such an absolute renunciation of all the parts of our existence for the benefit of an abstract being, he tells us that the sovereign, that is the social body, can neither harm the totality of its members, nor any of them in particular. Since everyone gives himself entirely, all share the same condition, and nobody is interested in making that condition onerous to the others. Because every individual gives himself to all, he does not give himself to anyone in particular. Everybody acquires over his associates the same rights as he surrenders in their favour. Thus he gains the equivalent of all that he loses together with greater strength to preserve what he has. However, Rousseau forgets that all those preserving attributes which he confers on the abstract being he calls the sovereign, derive from the fact that it is formed by all individuals without exception. But as soon as the sovereign must make use of the power which he possesses, or in other words, as soon as it is necessary to proceed to the practical organization of authority, as the sovereign cannot exercise it himself, he must delegate it, and all those attributes disappear. Because the action performed in the name of all is necessarily, whether we like it or not, at the disposal of a single individual or of a few, it happens that, in giving oneself to all, one does not give oneself to nobody, on the contrary, one submits oneself to those who act in the name of all. Hence it follows that, by giving ourselves entirely, we do not enter a condition equal for all, because some derive exclusive advantage from the sacrifice of the rest. It is not true that nobody has an interest in making the condition of the others more onerous, because there are associates who are above the common condition. It is not true that all associates gain the same rights as those they renounce. Not all of them gain the equivalent of what they lose, and the result of what they sacrifice is, or can be, the establishment of a power which takes away from them whatever they have.
Rousseau himself was appalled by these consequences. Horrorstruck at the immense social power which he had thus created, he did not know into whose hands to commit such monstrous force, and he could find no other protection against the danger inseparable from such sovereignty, than an expedient which made its exercise impossible. He declared that sovereignty could not be alienated, delegated or represented. This was equivalent to declaring, in other words, that it could not be exercised. It meant in practice destroying the principle which he had just proclaimed.
Observe instead how much franker the partisans of despotism are in their course when they set out from the same axiom, since it is an axiom which supports and favours them. Hobbes, the man who has most intelligently reduced despotism to a system, hastened to acknowledge sovereignty as unlimited, in order to infer from this the legitimacy of the absolute government of a single individual. Sovereignty, he says, is absolute; this truth has been recognized in all times, even by those who have excited sedition or provoked civil wars: their aim was not to annihilate sovereignty, but rather to transfer its exercise elsewhere. Democracy is absolute sovereignty in the hands of all; aristocracy absolute sovereignty in the hands of some; monarchy absolute sovereignty in the hands of one man. The people have relinquished that absolute sovereignty in favour of a monarch, who has become its absolute possessor.
It is clear that the absolute character which Hobbes attributes to the sovereignty of the people is the basis of his entire system. The word absolute distorts the whole question, and leads us in to a series of fresh implications. It is the point where the writer abandons the path of truth to proceed by sophism, towards the aim which he proposed to himself when he set out. He proves that, since the conventions established by men are not sufficient to ensure that they will be observed, a coercive power is necessary to force men to observe them. Because society must protect itself from external aggression, it needs a common force armed for common defence. Because men are divided by their pretensions, they need laws to regulate their rights. He concludes from the first point that the sovereign has the absolute right to punish; from the second, that he has the absolute right to make war; from the third, that he is the absolute legislator. Nothing could be more false than these conclusions. The sovereign has indeed the right to punish, but only in the case of guilty actions. He has the right to make war, but only when society is attacked. He has the right to make laws, but only when these laws are necessary and when they are in accord with justice. Consequently, nothing is absolute or arbitrary in these attributions. Democracy is indeed authority entrusted to the hands of all, but it is only the measure of authority necessary for the safety of the association. Aristocracy is the same authority entrusted to a few. Monarchy, the same authority conferred on a single person. The people can renounce that authority in favour of a single individual or of a few. But their power is still as limited as that of the people who have invested them with it. By the suppression of a single word, gratuitously introduced into the construction of a sentence, Hobbes' whole dreadful system collapses. On the contrary, with the word absolute, neither liberty nor, as we shall see below, peace nor happiness are possible under any institutions. Popular government is simply a violent tyranny, monarchical government only a more concentrated despotism.
When sovereignty is unlimited, there is no means of sheltering individuals from governments. It is in vain that you pretend to submit governments to the general will. It is always they who dictate the content of this will, and all your precautions become illusory. . . .
No authority upon earth is unlimited, neither that of the people, nor that of the men who declare themselves their representatives, nor that of the kings, by whatever title they reign, nor, finally, that of the law, which, being merely the expression of the will of the people or of the prince, according to the form of government, must be circumscribed within the same limits as the authority from which it emanates.
The citizens possess individual rights independently of all social and political authority, and any authority which violates these rights becomes illegitimate. The rights of the citizens are individual freedom, religious freedom, freedom of opinion, which includes the freedom to express oneself openly, the enjoyment of property, a guarantee against all arbitrary power. No authority can call these rights into question without destroying its own credentials. . . .
Let us now sum up the consequences of our principles. The sovereignty of the people is not unlimited: it is, on the contrary, circumscribed within the limits traced by justice and by the rights of individuals. The will of an entire people cannot make just what is unjust. The representatives of the nation have no right to do what the nation itself has no right to do. No monarch, whatever title he may claim, whether that title rests upon divine right, the right of conquest or the assent of the people, possesses a power without limits. God, if he intervenes in human affairs, can only sanction justice. The right of conquest is simply force, which is not a right, since it passes to whomever seizes it. The assent of the people cannot legitimate what is illegitimate, because the people cannot delegate to anyone authority which they do not themselves possess.
An objection presents itself against the limitation of sovereignty. Is it really possible to limit it? Can any force effectively prevent it from crossing the barriers prescribed to it? It is possible, some will argue, through ingenious combinations, to restrain power by dividing it. We may set its different parts in opposition and balance them against one another. Yet by what means can we ensure that the total sum will not be unlimited? How is it possible to limit power other than through power itself?
No doubt, the abstract limitation of sovereignty is not sufficient. We must find for political institutions foundations which combine the interest of the different holders of power so that their most apparent, most durable and most certain advantage would be to remain within the limits of their respective attributions. . . .
 
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The extract is from Chapter One, “On the Sovereignty of the People,” of the 1815 edition of Principles of Politics Applicable to All Governments, in Benjamin Constant, Political Writings. Translated and edited by Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge University Press, 1988).  Liberty Fund published in 2003 an English translation of the 1810 edition of the Principles of Politics by Dennis O’Keefe, in which the following portrait of Constant appears as the frontispiece.

Sunday, October 13, 2013

From War to Commerce

Benjamin Constant (1767-1830) was a French novelist, essayist, and political actor whose writings form a distinguished part of the canon of classical liberalism. An important bridge between Montesquieu and Tocqueville, Constant was a more controversial figure than these two giants. His passionate love affairs were the stuff of scandal and gossip; he was an inveterate gambler. “He violated many cherished human conventions,” writes his biographer, Harold Nicolson; “yet he remains an incomparable man.”(1) [Article length: 3000 words]

Constant’s political reputation was sullied by his decision to cooperate with Napoleon during the “100 days” (after Napoleon’s return from Elba), when Constant was called upon to draft a constitution (“La Benjamine”) that registered Napoleon’s concessions to a constitutional regime. Only a short time before, Constant had risen to a high pitch of eloquence in denouncing Napoleon, especially in the work excerpted here, The Spirit of Conquest and Usurpation and Their Relation to European Civilization, first published as separate pamphlets in 1813.
Constant drew a stark contrast between commerce and war, and believed that the system of war would be supplanted by the spirit of commerce. Though harshly condemnatory of the baleful effects of conquest, Constant did not include wars of self defense in his indictment. He was willing to acknowledge that war is not always an evil. This was true not only of wars of self-defense but of those wars that flowed, in ancient times, simply from “man’s nature," when war formed in him "that greatness of soul, skill, sang-froid, scorn for death, without which he could never be confident that there was any form of cowardice he might not display.” But if war taught heroic devotion in past ages, and if its virtues were still necessary in defensive wars, the spirit of conquest introduced by Napoleon had led to extremely grim results.

The choice Constant poses between war and commerce continues to be a critical factor in international affairs, and the logic that led Constant to favor commerce over war has been widely adopted by the nations. This is progress.

The following extracts from The Spirit of Conquest were beautifully translated by Biancamaria Fontana, of whom more below:
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The warrior peoples of antiquity owed their bellicose spirit mainly to the situation in which they found themselves. Divided into small tribes, they contended by force of arms for the possession of a narrow territory. Driven by necessity against one another, they fought or threatened each other incessantly. Even those who had no ambition to be conquerors, could still not lay down their sword lest they should themselves be conquered. For all of them the price of their security, their independence, their whole existence was war.
Our world is, in this respect, precisely the opposite of the ancient world. While in the past each nation formed an isolated family, the born enemy of other families, a great mass of human beings now exist that, despite the different names under which they live and their different forms of social organization, are essentially homogeneous in their nature. This mass is strong enough to have nothing to fear from hordes that arc still barbarous. It is sufficiently civilized to find war a burden. Its uniform tendency is towards peace. The warlike tradition, a heritage from distant ages, and above all the errors of governments, slow down the effects of this tendency, but every day it makes further progress. The leaders of nations pay tribute to it when they try to avoid an open confession of their ambition for conquest and their hopes for a glory won solely by force of arms. The son of Philip [Alexander the Great] would no longer dare to propose to his subjects the invasion of the universe; and the discourse of Pyrrhus to Cineas would appear today the height of insolence or folly.
A government that spoke of military glory as an aim would betray ignorance of, or contempt for, the spirit of nations and the age. It would be in error by a thousand years. Even if it should initially succeed, it would be interesting to see who in the end would win this odd wager, our own century or the offending government.
We have finally reached the age of commerce, an age which must necessarily replace that of war, as the age of war was bound to precede it. War and commerce are only two different means to achieve the same end, that of possessing what is desired. Commerce is simply a tribute paid to the strength of the possessor by the aspirant to possession. It is an attempt to obtain by mutual agreement what one can no longer hope to obtain through violence. A man who was always the stronger would never conceive the idea of commerce. It is experience, by proving to him that war, that is, the use of his strength against the strength of others, is open to a variety of obstacles and defeats, that leads him to resort to commerce, that is, to a milder and surer means of getting the interests of others to agree with his own.
War then comes before commerce. The former is all savage impulse, the latter civilized calculation. It is clear that the more the commercial tendency prevails, the weaker must the tendency to war become.
The sole aim of modern nations is repose, and with repose comfort, and, as source of comfort, industry. War becomes every day a more ineffective means of attaining this aim. Its hazards no longer offer either to individuals or to nations benefits that match the results of work and regular exchange. Among the ancients, a successful war increased both private and public wealth in the form of slaves, tributes and lands shared out. For the moderns, even a successful war always costs more than it brings in.
The Roman republic, with no commerce, no letters, no arts, no other domestic occupation than agriculture, restricted to a territory too small for its inhabitants, surrounded by barbarous tribes, always threatened or threatening, followed its natural destiny in pursuing uninterrupted military adventures. A government which in our day wished to imitate the Roman republic, would differ from it in that, acting in opposition to its own people, it would make the instruments of its policy at least as unhappy as its victims. A people thus governed would be the Roman republic without its liberty, without that national impulse that makes all sacrifices easy, without the hope that each individual enjoyed of a share in the conquered land, without, in short, all those circumstances which made that hazardous and troubled kind of life attractive to the Romans. . . .
War has lost its charm as well as its utility. Man is no longer driven to it either by interest or by passion.
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Constant draws attention, much like the American founders, to the dangers of standing military establishments. Not only do these pose the danger of a “state within a state” but they also draw young people away from education and enlightenment at an impressionable age, incurring incalculable costs for society.
An exclusive and hostile corporate spirit is bound to dominate those associations whose aim is different from that of other men. Notwithstanding the mildness and purity of Christianity, the confederations of its priests have frequently formed separate states within a state. Everywhere the men who compose an army set themselves apart from the rest of the nation. They develop a kind of respect for the use of that force of which they are the holders. Their customs and ideas become subversive of those principles of order and of peaceful and regular liberty that all governments have the interest, as well as the duty, to hold sacred. (60)
In certain periods of life, any interruption in the exercise of our intellectual faculties cannot be repaired. The hazardous, negligent and gross habits of the warrior state, the sudden rupture of all domestic relations, a mechanical dependence when the enemy is not present, total independence in morals at the age when passions are most active in their ferment: these can hardly be irrelevant for either morality or knowledge. The needless condemnation to life in camps or barracks of the youthful offspring of the enlightened class, in whom reside, as in a precious vessel, learning, delicacy, rightness of mind and that tradition of gentleness, nobility and elegance that alone distinguishes us from the barbarians, is to cause to the nation as a whole an evil that can never be compensated either by its vain successes, or by the terror it inspires, a terror that brings it no advantage whatsoever. (68)
Constant was especially aggravated by the lies and hypocrisy that so often attends the justification for war. Unlike earlier ages, when conquerors might plainly avow their intention, the very incompatibility of war with the desire of modern nations for peace meant that conquest had to rely on “sophism and imposture.” This result, he suggests, was as true for Napoleon as for his revolutionary predecessors 
Even whilst abandoning itself to its grandiose projects, the government would hardly dare to tell the nation: 'Let us march to conquer the world!' It would reply with one voice: 'We have no wish to conquer the world'. Instead it would talk of national independence, of national honour, of the rounding off of frontiers, of commercial interests, of precautions dictated by foresight, and what next? The vocabulary of hypocrisy and injustice is inexhaustible. It would talk of national independence, as if the independence of a nation were in jeopardy because other nations are independent. It would talk of national honour, as if a nation's honour were injured because other nations retain their own. (64)
The French revolution saw the invention of a pretext for war previously unknown, that of freeing peoples from the yoke of their governments, which were supposed to be illegitimate and tyrannical. On this pretext, death was brought among men, some of whom lived quietly under institutions softened be time and habit while others had enjoyed for several centuries all the benefits of liberty. Forever shameful age, when an infamous government inscribed sacred words on its guilty standards, troubled peace, violated independence, destroyed the prosperity of its innocent ncighhours, adding to the scandal of Europe by its lying protestations of respect for the rights of men and zeal for humanity! The worst of all conquests is the hypocritical one, says Machiavelli, as if he had foreseen our history. (65n)
[In attempting conquest in modern times,] Authority would have to work upon the intellectual faculties of the mass of its subjects in the same way as upon the moral qualities of the military component. It would have to strive to banish all logic from the spirit of the former, as it would have tried to suffocate all humanity in the hearts of the latter. All words would lose their meaning. 'Moderation' would presage violence; 'justice' would announce iniquity. The law of nations would become a code of expropriation and barbarism. All those notions that several centuries of enlightenment have introduced into the relations between societies as in those between individuals, would once again be thrust back. Mankind would regress to that time of devastation that seemed to us the disgrace of history. Hypocrisy alone will distinguish the two: and this hypocrisy will prove still more corrupting since no one will believe in it. It is not only when they confuse and deceive people that the lies of authority are harmful: they are no less so when they do not deceive them in the least. (65-66)
[I]t is one thing to defend one's fatherland, another to attack people who themselves have a fatherland to defend. The spirit of conquest seeks to confuse these two ideas. Some governments, when they send their armies from one pole to the other, still talk about the defence of their hearths; one would think they call all the places to which they have set fire their hearths. (69)
We are always hearing about the great empire, of the whole nation, abstract notions that have no reality. The great empire is nothing independently of its provinces. The whole nation is nothing separated from the parts that compose it. It is in defending the rights of these parts that one defends the rights of the whole nation; since the nation itself is divided into each of those parts. If they are successively stripped of what they hold clearest, if each of them, isolated so as to be made a victim, reverts, by a strange metamorphosis, to being a portion of the great whole, to serve as the pretext for the sacrifice of another portion, the real beings are sacrificed to the abstract one. The people as individuals are sacrificed for the sake of the people en masse. (77)
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In some of his most interesting passages, Constant develops the contrast between the objectives of ancient and modern conquerors. Whereas the ancients, when they did not destroy a people, would allow to it its traditional customs and ways of life, the way of modern conquerors was to insist upon uniformity. These passages remarkably prophecy the totalitarian tendency of the twentieth century:

Conquest among the ancients often destroyed entire nations. But when it did not destroy them, it left untouched all the objects of men's strongest attachments: their ways of life, their laws, their customs, their gods. Things are not the same in modern times. The vanity of civilization is more tormenting than the pride of barbarism. The latter sees only the mass; the former examines anxiously and in detail.
The conquerors of antiquity, satisfied with general obedience, did not investigate the domestic life or the local relations of their slaves. The subject populations rediscovered almost intact, in the depth of their remote provinces, all that constitutes the charm of life: the habits of their childhood, the consecrated practices, that cluster of memories that, in spite of political subjection, preserves the feeling of a fatherland in a country.
The conquerors of our days, whether peoples or princes, wish their empire to present an appearance of uniformity, upon which the proud eye of power may travel without meeting any unevenness that could offend or limit its view. (72-73)
The interests and memories that arise from local customs contain a germ of resistance that authority is reluctant to tolerate and that it is anxious to eradicate. It can deal more successfully with individuals; it rolls its heavy body effortlessly over them as if they were sand. (74) 
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Madame de Staël, Constant’s intimate friend, once observed of Bonaparte that he “considers every kind of morality a formula which has no more significance than the complimentary close of a letter. After you have assured your correspondent that you are his humble servant, he has no right to require anything of you. In the same way, Bonaparte believes that anyone who says he loves liberty, or believes in God, or prefers a clear conscience to self-interest, is just a man following the forms of etiquette to explain his ambitious pretensions or selfish calculations.”(n2) It was with this trait of Bonaparte in mind that Constant wrote of the “inevitable end to the successes of a conquering nation,” holding that a conqueror reliant on the force and fraud characteristic of Machiavellianism would learn that he had “presumed too much upon the degradation of the world.”

He will learn that calculations based upon immorality and baseness, those calculations on which he prided himself so recently as a sublime discovery, are as uncertain as they are short-sighted, as deceptive as they are ignoble. He laughed at the stupidity of virtue, at that trust in a disinterestedness that seemed to him a chimera, at that appeal to an exaltation whose motives and duration he could not understand, and which he had been tempted to take as the passing access of a sudden disease. Now he discovers that egoism has its own brand of stupidity: that he is no less ignorant about what is good than honesty is about what is evil, and that, in order to know men, it is not sufficient to despise them. Mankind becomes an enigma to him. All around him people talk of generosity, of sacrifices, of devotion. This unfamiliar language comes as a surprise to his ears. He has no idea how to negotiate in that idiom. He remains paralysed, shocked by his failure to understand, a memorable example of Machiavellianism fallen victim to its own corruption. (80)
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Like Montesquieu, Constant was fertile of pithy expressions that summarized his over-arching philosophy. His lessons, persuasive as they are, are easily forgotten. Too bad that each generation gets to learn these lessons from its own experience, and does not have the wit to pick them up from books.

Commerce rests upon the good understanding of nations with each other, it can be sustained only by justice; it is founded upon equality; it thrives in peace. (65)
The commercial nations of modern Europe, industrious, civilized, placed on a territory large enough for their needs, linked to other peoples by relations the interruption of which would be a disaster, have nothing to hope for from conquest. A useless war is the greatest offence that a government today can commit. (81)

1. Harold Nicolson, Benjamin Constant (Greenwood Press, 1985 [first published in 1949]), x.
2. Major Writings of Germaine de Staël, Translated and with an Introduction by Vivian Folkenflik (Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 375.

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These selections are from Benjamin Constant, Political Writings, translated and edited by Biancamaria Fontana. Cambridge, 1988. Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought. Fontana's introduction to this volume is the best short introduction to Constant's life and thought. The portrait of Constant below is from the cover of Fontana's fine study, Benjamin Constant and the Post-Revolutionary Mind (Yale University Press, 1991).